The water governance crisis in Iran is rooted in several structural challenges, of which “conflict” is one of the most key. This phenomenon, as a situation in which the personal or organizational interests of the agents are prioritized over the public interest, leads to administrative weakening, waste of resources, and deviation from the macro goals. Despite the importance of this issue, instances and contexts of conflict of interest in the water sector of Iran have been less investigated in the field. The present study aimed to identify these instances, contexts, and consequences, using a qualitative approach and focus group interview method with 9 groups of specialists and experts, and its data was coded through content analysis. The findings show that the conflict of interest is rooted in three main structural contexts: 1) dependency of the rule-maker and the implementer, which results from the managers' job connections and political influence; 2) dependency of the observer and the subject, which is manifested in the weakness of independent supervisory mechanisms, especially in large contracts; and finally 3) conflict of income and duties, which has transformed governance institutions into revenue-generating enterprises and marginalized the inherent duty of water protection. The results of this study indicated that conflict of interest is not an individual and accidental phenomenon, but rather a structural problem in the country's water governance system that has led to an escalation of the crisis, a decrease in the quality of projects, and a weakening of public trust. Facing it requires fundamental reforms,