ارزیابی سیاست‌های مدیریت منابع آب در حالت وجود اطلاعات ناقص با استفاده از بازی علامت‌دهی، مطالعه موردی: حوضه آبریز زاینده رود

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری مدیریت منابع آب/دانشکده مهندسی عمران، دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

2 استاد/دانشکده مهندسی عمران، دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. ایمیل: hasafavi@iut.ac.ir

3 استاد/ دانشکده مهندسی عمران، پردیس دانشکده‌های فنی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

چکیده

افزایش نیازهای آبی در دهه‌های اخیر توأم با نوسانات اقلیمی و همچنین وجود ذی‌نفعان‌‌ مختلف با اهداف و تمایلات متضاد فرآیند تخصیص آب را پیچیده کرده است. اجرای طرح‌ها و پروژه‌های انتقال آب عمدتاً با اطلاع‌رسانی صورت می‌گیرد اما در زمان اجرا، اطلاعات مربوط به این طرح‌ها ازجمله میزان آورد واقعی این طرح‌ها و نحوه تخصیص آن بین ذی‌نفعان و مشخص نیست. در این مقاله به‌منظور در نظر گرفتن عدم قطعیت‌های موجود درباره طرح ملی شیرین سازی و انتقال آب از خلیج‌فارس به صنایع استان اصفهان از بازی علامت‌دهی استفاده می‌شود. در این مقاله بازی علامت‌دهی با در نظر گرفتن عدم قطعیت‌های موجود درباره طرح ملی شیرین سازی و انتقال آب از خلیج‌فارس به صنایع استان اصفهان و با حضور وزارت نیرو به‌عنوان فرستنده و کشاورزان به‌عنوان گیرنده توسعه داده می‌شود. تعادل این بازی از نوع یک‌کاسه است به‌طوری‌که در این تعادل، وضعیت اجرای طرح ملی و سیاست پشت پرده برای احقاق حق‌آبه کشاورزان و تالاب گاوخونی در هر حالتی که باشد برای وزارت نیرو بهینه است که حداکثر به میزان 60 درصد تأمین حق‌آبه گندم کاران از آب سطحی برای کشت آن‌ها از سد زاینده‌رود رها کند و از سوی دیگر کشاورزان نیز سطح زیر کشت خود را به میزان 10 درصد کاهش دهند. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که در صورت تمرکز یک‌جانبه وزارت نیرو به ارزش اقتصادی آب و عدم توجه به جنبه‌های اجتماعی، حقوقی و زیست‌محیطی، حتی با اجرای این طرح ملی، تمایلی برای احقاق حق‌آبه کشاورزان یا تالاب بین‌المللی گاوخونی نخواهد داشت.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Assessment of Water Resources Policies under Incomplete Information using Signaling Game, Case Study: ZayandehRud River Basin

نویسندگان [English]

  • ZohreSadat Ahmadi 1
  • Hamid Reza Safavi 2
  • Reza Kerachian 3
1 Ph.D Candidate, Department of Civil Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran.
2 Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran.
3 Professor, School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Increasing water demands and climate variability in recent decades, as well as the presence of various stakeholders with conflicting goals and tendencies have resulted in serious challenges and complicated water allocation. In addition, there are some kinds of incomplete information in water resources management, which may include uncertainties about hydrological variables, available water resources, implementation of long-term plans and inter-basin water transfer projects. The existence of this information asymmetry will definitely affect the performance and decision-making of the stakeholders. So, it is necessary to consider these uncertainties in management of water resources in the basin. In this paper water allocation under asymmetric information between the ministry of energy as sender and the agriculture sector as receiver regarding implementing water desalination and transmission from the Persian Gulf to Isfahan industries has been modeled using signaling game a type of dynamic game with incomplete information. The equilibrium of the game is pooling consequently ministry of energy in all types of implementation of the national water transfer plan and unknown policies about the environmental or agricultural rights sends the same signal. The best strategy is to release only 60% of water requirements for wheat farmers from the Zayandehrood dam. On the other hand, agriculture sector should reduce their crop area by 10%. The results show that if the ministry of energy managers focus only on economic value and disregard the social, legal and environmental aspects even with this national plan will implement, they will not so inclined to afford agricultural and environmental rights.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Water Resources Allocation
  • game theory
  • Asymmetric information
  • Water Transmission
  • Desalination
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